In this paper, a novel joint planning framework is proposed to coordinate the investment and operation of renewable energy sources and energy storage systems (ESS) in energy and ancillary services markets. Based on this framework, coordinated planning and operation model under centralized and deregulated market mechanism is studied, and multiple factors such as siting and sizing of wind turbine and ESS, the efficiency of ESS, transmission lines constraints are considered. For the centralized market mechanism, the coordinated model aiming at maximizing social welfare is established, which is a tractable single-level optimization problem. For the deregulated market mechanism, the coordinated model aiming at maximizing investment profits is established, which is an intractable bi-level optimization problem as the locational marginal price in the objective function. The bi-level optimization problem is reformulated into a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The big-M method and strong dual theory are used to deal with the nonlinearity in constraints and objective functions, and the problem is transformed into a mixed-integer linear programming, which can be solved by commercial software. Furthermore, the impact of production tax credit and investment tax credit financial incentive policies on investment behavior has been studied, and the evaluation indexes of electrical information and economy have been established. The proposed approach has been implemented on the IEEE 6-bus and the IEEE 30-bus test systems, and results justify the efficiency of the model proposed.
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I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Renewable energy sources (RES) must be popularized in the mid-century to limit global warming to 2 • C and avoid dangerous energy shortages and climate change [1] . It is encouraging that a series of policies on promoting RES development have been implemented around the world to accelerate the transition to clean energy generation. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which makes sure a proportion of RES included in the final energy consumption mix, is a common policy instrument employed in many countries as a tool to push renewable power installation or reduce greenhouse gas emissions [2] . The European Council and the European Union Parliament recently approved the renewable energy directive targets that RES share in the portfolio of power consumption by the year 2020 reaches 20% [3] . The Republic of Ghana aims to develop and utilize RES and energy efficiency technologies to achieve a 10% penetration of national electricity production by 2020 [4] . In general, the planning and operation of the power system with RES recently has been drawing extensive attention in the power industry. The electricity sector faces challenges from both load demand and renewable energy target (RET) under the RPS framework [5] . Firstly, the load demand is considered to continue to increase as the economy and population growth. Secondly, it is mandatory to achieve the RET in response to the national energy strategy. How to achieve RET while ensuring the economy of a power system is the most concerned problem of the electricity sector. We can analyze this problem from three aspects: the inherent characteristics of the power system, the perspective of decision-makers, and the participation of the government.
For a complex power system, coordinated planning and operation can improve the economy, because the interaction of sources, grid, and load are considered [6] . Reference [7] presents a flexible, reliable, and renewable power system resource planning approach to coordinate generation, transmission, and energy storage systems (ESS) expansion planning in the presence of demand response. Reference [8] presents a scenario-based stochastic active distribution network planning model considering the multi-type distributed generation and ESS. Reference [9] presents a two-stage minmax-min model for jointly optimize the system's resources for meeting the RET under high security standards and renewable uncertainty. These studies have proved that it is reasonable to achieve the RET efficiently through the coordinated planning and operation technology of the power system.
From the perspective of decision-makers, the impact of market mechanisms on decision-making programs cannot be ignored [10] . Under the centralized market mechanism, the independent system operators (ISO) always pursue to maximize social welfare or the sum of all utilities while ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the power system, where the social welfare is the total benefit accrued from all consumption minus the total cost of generation [11] . Under the deregulated market mechanism, market participants always pursue of the maximization the expected net present value of the profit obtained [12] . What is the trend of RES installed capacity under the two market mechanisms of maximizing social welfare and maximizing investment profit? Which market mechanism can push the development of RES? These problems will be solved in this paper.
The visible hand of government is as important as the invisible hand of market competition [13] . Financial incentives to reduce CO 2 emissions are studied in [14] and they can promote the development of RES and achieve RET. RES power generation is characterized by high capital costs together with weather-dependent production [15] . As a result, these RES are prevented from being perfectly competitive in a liberalized electricity market. The incentive of RES investment through financial subsidy policies is widely recognized in many countries. Reference [16] divides financial subsidy policy into short-term (i.e. direct subsidies, an income tax exemption for RES) and long-term (i.e. feed-in tariffs, auctions, and the quota system). In [17] , financial incentives are classified into quantity-based and price-based, and where support schemes for the former are determined by the market, support schemes for the latter are characterized by a fixed price determined by the regulator. In general, RES investment has characteristics of a substantial initial investment and high risk, a long return period, and investors have difficulties receiving financing [18] . Therefore, RES investment problems with the RPS framework typically call for government interventions to address market failures associated with target and investment in RES [19] .
Existing substantial literatures use different techniques to explore the planning and operation of power systems from different aspects [20] . The impact of market mechanism and financial incentives on TG expansion planning are studied in [21] . Different from the existing research, this paper focuses on the coordinated planning of RES and ESS under the framework of RPS. The coordinated planning model with the objective function of maximizing social welfare and maximizing investment profits is respectively established to study RES investment under the centralized and deregulated market mechanism. The potentialities and fragilities of financial incentives for RES development are analyzed. The coordinated planning method that can determine the siting and sizing of RES and ESS in this paper is a static model, which only determines where and what type of RES and ESS should be built in the extended power system. It should be noted that time series production is used to describe the dynamic balance characteristics of the power system to achieve the coordination of planning and operation scheduling [22] . The static model and time series production are combined to constitute the tradeoff between accuracy and tractability. As mentioned in [23] , the proposed coordinated planning approach can be simply extended to become a dynamic tool at the expense of a higher computation burden.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1) The coordinated planning and operation model of RES and ESS with co-optimization of energy and auxiliary services is presented respectively under the centralized and deregulated market mechanism. The impact of financial incentives is studied, the potentialities and fragilities of these subsidy policies are analyzed. Our research results provide suggestions for the existing financial incentives to promote the development of RES and ESS.
2) For the centralized market mechanism, the total revenue collected from the participation of RES and ESS in electricity markets and financial policies does not exceed the financial subsidy. However, the total revenue under deregulated market mechanisms is no less than the financial subsidy.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the mathematical model of generator and ESS. In Section III, a detailed coordinated planning and operation model is provided under the centralized market mechanism. In Section IV, a bi-level coordinated planning and operation model is presented under the deregulated market mechanism. In Section V, the influence of financial incentive policy on investment behavior is analyzed. In Section VI, the proposed model is tested on the modified IEEE 6-bus and IEEE 30-bus test system and the obtained numerical results are discussed extensively. Finally, relevant conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Without losing the general, the power system to be expanded contains N buses and L transmission lines. Since the focus in this paper is on coordinated planning and operation of RES and ESS, investors in RES and ESS are assumed to belong to one coalition. As a daily time horizon can sufficiently model the dynamics and cyclic behaviors of ESS, and a daily time is divided into T = 24 hourly time slots. Considering the computational burden, we assume that future demand and supply information is known.
A. THERMAL GENERATOR
The traditional power supply represented by TG. The operation cost of TG includes the generation cost or fuel consumption cost, which can be expressed as a quadratic model. Besides, the regulation cost of auxiliary services provided by TG is considered. The total costs and constraints are as follows [24] .
Equation (1) represents the operation and regulation cost of all TG on the daily time horizon. Equations (1) and (3) denote the ramp-up and ramp-down capacity of TG, respectively. Equation (4) indicates that the power production of TG is restricted by the minimum and maximum limits. For notational simplicity, we assume that each node has a TG. In fact, the power production of the node without TG is always zero, and the WT and ESS are similar, which will not be discussed later.
B. RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
RES represented by WT and photovoltaic has developed rapidly in recent years. Although their production power characteristics vary greatly, there is little difference in the mathematical model, and this paper takes wind power as an example. The investment cost of WT (per MW capacity) prorated capital cost amortized over its life span. It is widely known that RES generation has zero marginal cost [25] , and the production cost of WT is ignored. The total cost and operational constraints of WT are as follows.
Equation (5) represents the investment cost of WT. Equation (6) denotes the power production limit of WT. Equation (7) indicates the number limit of WT is a positive number. Note that n w,i is considered as a continuous variable instead of an integer variable to reduce the computational burden due to the capacity of a single WT unit is very small.
C. ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM
For a power system integrated with RES generation, the ESS plays a critical role in mitigating the system uncertainties and maintaining the supply and demand balance. The total cost of ESS includes operation and maintenance (O&M) cost, regulation cost, and construction investment [26] . The frequent charging and discharging cycling of ESS lead to extra O&M costs as it may accelerate ESS degradation, and the O&M cost is usually modeled to be proportional to the amount of charging and discharging energy of ESS [27] . 
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Equation (8) stands for the sum of degradation cost, regulation cost and investment cost of ESS. Equations (9) and (10) denote the maximum charging and discharging limits of ESS. Equation (11) ensures that no ESS simultaneously charges and discharges which results in mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model for ESS in some references [28] . Actually, Equation (11) is redundant when charging and discharging efficiency is considered and the MILP model can be exactly relaxed to a linear model to reduce the computational burden [29] . Equation (12) bounds that the discharging power and regulation up the capacity of ESS must be within the rated power. Equation (13) limits that the charging power and regulation down the capacity of ESS must be within the rated power. Equation (14) represents the dynamics of the stored energy. Equation (15) indicates that the SOC of ESS is limited by lower bound and upper bound to avoid deep discharging and overcharging. Equation (16) binds the initial and final stored energy levels of each ESS in every representative day. Equation (17) forces the number of ESS to be non-negative, and n es,i can also be considered as a continuous variable.
III. COORDINATED PLANNING AND OPERATION UNDER CENTRALIZED MARKET MECHANISM
In this section, a coordinated planning and operation model is presented under the centralized market mechanism. The centralized market mechanism endows ISO with full physical rights, and the operation strategy of WT and ESS is obtained by solving the multi-stage economic scheduling problem. Therefore, the coordinated planning model aiming at maximizing social welfare is proposed to determine the siting and sizing of WT and ESS. Maximizing social welfare is one of the most important economic features of market-based power systems. A maximization social welfare problem can be solved in a minimization form as the total cost [30] .
A. MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE
The social optimum scheme is the solution to the following optimization problem with an objective to minimize the overall system cost including the total operation cost, the regulation cost, the investment cost. The dynamic balance constraints of power system with multi-time coupling are considered, such as the operation constraints of TG and WT, dynamic constraints of ESS, node power balance, line power flow constraints, and regulation capacity constraints.
The first sum calculates the cost of operation and ancillary services of TG. The second sum calculates the cost of discharging, charging, and regulation of ESS. The third and fourth sum represent the investment cost of WT and ESS, respectively.
Equation (19) represents the nodal power balance. Equation (20) restricts the power flow of the specified transmission line considering its maximum thermal limit, and based on the standard DC power flow assumptions of lossless lines, constant bus voltages, and small phase angle difference between neighboring buses in line with the previous research works in the area, such as [31] . Equation (21) represent the minimum requirement on the regulation up capacity. Equation (22) represent the minimum requirement on the regulation down capacity. Besides, TG operation constraints are given in (1)-(4). The investment and operation constraints of WT are given in (6)- (7) . The investment and operation constraints of ESS are given in (9)- (17). The coordinated planning for maximizing social welfare is formulated as MILP, which can be solved by commercial software (i.e. Gurobi solver). The investment decision variables are the siting and sizing of WT and ESS. The operation decision variables the power generation of TG and WT, the power discharging and charging as well as SOC of ESS, the voltage phase angles, and the regulation up/down capacity provided by TG or ESS.
B. ZERO INVESTMENT PROFITS
In the investment case of maximizing social welfare under the centralized market mechanism, ESS straightforwardly profits through intertemporal arbitrage, also known as load shifting and peak shaving [32] . The total revenue collected from ancillary services provided by ESS and power production by WT. Note that in this study, the storage facility is part of a storage-wind nor storage-solar a coalition, instead of is part of the portfolio of a dominant generation company. The profits of coalition are defined as the difference between the total revenue and the investment and operation costs. Let TIP represent the total investment profits of the coalition.
The first sum calculates the payment the WT receives from the energy market that settles in the LMP widely used in the wholesale electricity market in USA [26] . The first two term in the second sum calculates the payment the ESS receives from the energy market that settles in the LMP. The third and fourth term in the second sum calculates the payment of the ESS from the regulation market that settles in the power system regulation up and down prices. The third sum represents the operation cost of discharging, charging, as well as providing ancillary services of ESS. The fourth and fifth sum represent the investment cost of WT and ESS, respectively. LMP, system regulation up and down prices are Lagrange multiplier (dual variables) associated with the constraints (19) , and (21)-(22), respectively. A theorem can be obtained:
Theorem: The coordinated planning of WT and ESS investment with maximizing social welfare always yields zero investment profit if the initial state of charge at each ESS is zero. No matter WT or ESS, the revenue collected from participating in energy and ancillary services markets exactly covers the cost of investment and operation at a social optimum. The balance between WT income and investment is proved by applying the generalized Lagrange multiplier method, first-order optimality conditions and complementary slackness conditions [34] .
Proof: The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian function by the primal variables. The detailed KKT conditions are given in Appendix A, part of which is as follows.
Equations (24) and (25) are obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian function by the p t w,i and n w,i , respectively. The revenue of WT production can be derived through arithmetic manipulation of the KKT conditions. We multiply both sides of equation (24) by p t w,i , and obtain equation (26) .
To simplify equation (26), we apply the complementary slackness conditions equation (27) and (28) of equation (6).
Substituting equation (27) and (28) into (26), and obtain the revenue of WT generation from energy market.
Similar, we multiply both sides of equation (25) by n w,i , and obtain equation (30) .
To simplify equation (30), we apply the complementary slackness conditions of equation (7).
Substituting equation (30) into (29) , and obtain equation (32) .
Compare equation (32) with equation (33), we conclude that the revenue of WT generation is always zero. Similarly, the revenue and investment of ESS are balanced, which is proved in reference [33] .
IV. COORDINATED PLANNING AND OPERATION UNDER DEREGULATED MARKET MECHANISM
Different from the centralized market mechanism in Section III, the coordinated planning and operation model in this section is proposed under the deregulated market mechanism. The deregulated market mechanism endows investors with full physical rights and allows the owner to directly control ESS and WT operation for every node and at every period [10] . Therefore, the coordinated planning and operation model aiming at maximizing investment profit is proposed to determine the siting and sizing of WT and ESS.
A. MAXIMIZING INVESTMENT PROFIT
Following the convention in the related reference [35] , we consider the profit-maximization behavior of a windstorage coalition. The optimal siting and sizing of WT and ESS for profit-maximizing investment are formulated as bi-level problems. The upper-level problem models the planning and operation decisions of the WT and ESS facility from the coalition's perspective. The lower-level problems represent the market clearing process, for each hour of a day. The upper-level problem of maximizing TIP is as follows: 
Equation (33) 
The decision variables of the lower-level problem are the scheduling of TG and the phase angle of nodes. The nodal prices and the regulation up/down prices in the upper-level problem are the optimal solution of the lower-level problem, and the upper and lower level problems are interactive as shown in Figure 1 . Let X and Y represent the decision variables of upper-level and lower-level problems respectively. As shown in Figure 1 , for a given decision variable X 0 of the upper-level problem, the decision variable Y and the Lagrange multiplier or dual variable of constraints are obtained by solving the lower-level market clearing problem and returned to the upper level. It is not difficult to find that an optimization problem (upper-level problem) contains another optimization problem (lower-level problem) as a constraint [36] . The problem of maximizing investment profit under the deregulated market mechanism is a classic bi-level optimization. In the profit-maximizing investment case, investment and operation of WT and ESS are free, and the wind-storage coalition has positive benefits. However, the bi-level optimization problem is intractable and cannot be solved directly by commercial software. The solution method is given in Section IV-B.
B. SOLUTION METHOD
To solve the bi-level optimization in Section IV-A, the inherent nonlinearity in the definition of LMP and non-convex nonlinearity in the objective function described by equation (33) need to be tackled [37] . Firstly, the bi-level optimization is recast as a singlelevel linearized mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). This is achieved by substituting the convex lower-level problem with an equivalent set of constraints to the upper-level problem [38] . This set of constraints consists of KKT conditions of a lower-level problems, which can rewrite the convex optimization of lower-level problem into the constraint condition of the upper-level problem. The KKT conditions for the lower-level problem (34) are as follows.
In addition, the KKT condition also includes the primal constrain (1)-(4), and (19)- (22) . Solving optimization problem (34) is equivalent to solving the nonlinearity equations (35)-(49) as optimization problem (34) is convex and Slater's condition holds. Note that the nonlinearity is due to the complementary slackness constraints in equations (39)-(48). Nonlinear complementary slackness constraints can be reformulated into linear constraints by big-M method. Alternatively, one could employ the approach of Schur's decomposition, which is based on SOS-1 variables [39] .
where M represents a sufficiently large constant, and which are used to form disjunctive constraints [40] . So far, the inherent nonlinearity of in the definition of LMP is solved, and optimization problem (34) has been reformulated as a set of linear equality (35)- (38) and inequality constraints (50)-(60) over continuous and binary variables, and the bi-level optimization problem is rewritten as single-level optimization. Secondly, the nonlinearity of the objective function in equation (33) can be tackled through arithmetic manipulation and the strong duality theory. For a given upper-level decision variable X 0 , we define the following primal lower-level (PL) optimization problem as Q(X 0 , Y ).
where C and D are the coefficients of upper-level and lowerlevel decision variables respectively. J and K are the left-hand and right-hand coefficients of equations (1)- (4) . E and F are the left-hand coefficients of equations (19)- (22) , and G is the right-hand coefficients. We can write dual lower-level (DL) optimization problems as follows.
where and are dual variables or Lagrange multipliers of corresponding constraints respectively. According to the properties of strong duality theory, we can get equation (63). where the left-hand side is the primal optimal objective value and the right-hand side is the dual optimal objective value. We notice that the WT and ESS profits could be obtained after reordering.
The above expression is a linear function of dual variables, and the nonlinearity in the objective function in (33) is now tackled. Finally, the problem of maximizing investment returns is transformed into a MILP, which can be solved efficiently using commercial packages.
V. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT AND OPERATION
While the cost of solar and wind energy has declined rapidly in the recent past, it remains higher than those of conventional energy technologies. A large number of policy instruments have been implemented to support RES in worldwide. In [41] , the key policy instruments include feed-in-tariffs, investment tax credits, subsidies, favorable financing, mandatory access and purchase, renewable energy portfolio standards and public investment was highlighted. The policy instruments can be summarized into two categories [42] : a production based financial incentive with a production tax credit (PTC) for every MWh energy and every MW regulation capacity. Besides, capacity based financial incentives with an investment tax credit (ITC) that equals a certain portion of the capital cost. Assuming the PTC policy offers the wind-storage coalition a tax credit, and then the total coalition profit is given as follows. where σ w and σ es is a subsidies portion of the capital cost provided by ITC policies. The coordinated planning and operation model of maximizing social welfare and maximizing investment profit is studied under the above two financial incentives. Electrical information and economic indicators are used to evaluate the impact of PTC and ITC financial incentive policies on investors' behavior under two market mechanisms. Electrical information indicators include installed capacity of WT and ESS, the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. Economic indicators include social cost, profits of wind-storage alliance and financial subsidy.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed method is evaluated based on the modified IEEE 6-bus test system and the IEEE 30-bus test system [43] to demonstrate the mechanics of the proposed method. The numerical examples are implemented in MATLAB 2018a with Gurobi as the MILP solver, and run on a 3.5GHz Intel Xeon(R) Gold 6135M processor with 48 GB RAM and 64-bit Windows 10 system. The convergence tolerance of the algorithm is set on 10 −3 . The daily 24-hour load demand and WT production profiles are given in Figure 2 . In the numerical example, the daily capital cost of WT and ESS are obtained by applying the capital recovery factor. The amortized daily cost of WT and ESS are 100 $/MW and 300 $/MWh, respectively. The efficiency of ESS is set to 95%, and the ESS can be fully charged and discharged in 2 hours. The operation parameters are set as follows. The regulation requirement is set to be 10% of the system load demand. The maximum regulating up and down capacity of TG is set to 10% of the maximum capacity, and regulation up/down the cost of TG is 5 $/MW. The degradation costs associated with charging/discharging of ESS are 0.5 $/MWh, and regulation up/down cost of ESS are 0.5 $/MW [33] .
For financial incentive policies, we gradually increase the intensity of PTC and ITC financial subsidies to study the investment behavior of market participants. We set the step length of ω w , ω es and ω es,r to 6 $/MWh, 2 $/MWh and 1 $/MW, respectively. The step length of σ w and σ es are set to 8%. Finally, the energy delivery subsidy for WT gradually increasing from 0 $/MWh to 30 $/MWh, and the energy delivery subsidy for ESS gradually increasing from 0 $/MWh to 10 $/MWh, and the auxiliary service subsidy for ESS from 1 $/MW to 5 $/MW under the PTC policy. The capital cost subsidy portion of WT and ESS gradually increasing from 0% to 40% under the ITC policy.
A. MODIFIED IEEE 6-BUS TEST SYSTEM
This section presents the results obtained on a modified IEEE 6-bus test system. The modified test system has 6 nodes that are connected through 7 transmission lines, all nodes are allowed to install WT and ESS. The maximum load demand of node 3 is 56 MW, and that of node 4 and node 5 are 112 MW. The parameter of transmission lines and TG are given in Table 1 and Table 2 . Firstly, we study the impact of PTC financial incentives on investors' behavior under the centralized market mechanism. We numerically compare the installed capacity of WT and ESS achieved under PTC financial incentives, as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. The results are given in Figure 3 .
Let (ω w , ω es , ω es,r ) represent the energy delivery subsidy for WT and ESS, and auxiliary service subsidy for ESS under different PTC intensity. The installed capacity of WT and ESS are non-decreasing with the increase of PTC financial incentive intensity, as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. This result verifies the driving force of PTC policy on WT investment, and we can choose the appropriate intensity of PTC policy to achieve the predetermined RET. Further, the social cost, coalition profit and financial subsidy are given in Figure 4 . The social cost is decreasing while the coalition profit is increasing with the increase of PTC policy intensity. Wind energy is zero marginal cost, and ESS can promote the utilization of wind energy and reduce the power production of traditional generators in peak hours. As a result, the social cost is non-increasing. Note that the coalition profit is zero without financial subsidy. Besides, the fact that the financial subsidy is greater than the total coalition profit TCP PTC indicates that the revenue (TIP) of WT and ESS from the energy and auxiliary service market is non-positive.
Secondly, the impact of ITC policy on investors' behavior under the centralized market mechanism is studied. Similarly, the installed capacity of WT and ESS under ITC financial incentives is compared, as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. The results are shown in Figure 5 .
Let (σ w , σ es ) represent the capital cost subsidies portion for WT and ESS under different ITC intensity. Similar to PTC financial incentives, ITC can also promote the installed capacity of WT and ESS as well as the amount of wind energy utilization. When the proportion of ITC subsidy for WT and ESS reaches 40%, the utilization of wind energy increases from 411 MWh to 956 MWh. The social cost, coalition profit and financial subsidy are given in Figure 6 . The social cost is decreasing while the coalition profit is increasing with the increase of ITC policy intensity. However, it should be noted that coalition profit TCP ITC equals to financial subsidy under ITC policy. This means that the revenue TIP of WT and ESS in the energy and auxiliary service market is zero.
For the numerical results from the centralized market mechanism, from Figure 3 and Figure 5 , both PTC and ITC financial incentives can increase the installed capacity of WT and ESS to improve the utilization of wind energy. From Figure 4 and Figure 6 , both PTC and ITC financial incentives can reduce the social cost and increase the coalition profit. Besides, the revenue TIP of WT and ESS from the energy and auxiliary service market under the centralized market mechanism is non-positive.
Thirdly, we study the impact of PTC financial incentives on investors' behavior under the deregulated market mechanism.
The installed capacity of WT and ESS as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment result from under the deregulated market mechanism are given in Figure 7 . We find that the same intensity of PTC policy has no significant incentive effect on WT and ESS investment. Although the PTC subsidy intensity has been from (0, 0, 0) to (30, 10, 5) , the installed capacity of WT has only increased by 11 MW (form 33 MW to 44 MW), and the installed capacity of ESS has hardly increased, and the amount of wind energy utilization has only increased by 105 MWh (from 404 MWh to 509 MWh). The capital cost of WT and ESS is much higher than the production cost of TG, which makes it difficult for wind-storage coalition to profit from investment, and then the incentive effect of low-intensity PTC policy is limited. The social cost, coalition profit and financial subsidy are given in Figure 8 . It can be seen from Figure 8 that the social cost is stable and the coalition profit is gradually increasing with the increase of financial incentive intensity of PTC. Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 8 , the following two points are different. Without PTC financial subsidy (0, 0, 0), the coalition profit under centralized market mechanism is zero ( Figure 4) , while the coalition profit under deregulated market mechanism is 1768 $ (Figure 8) . Besides, the coalition profit TCP PTC under deregulated market mechanism (Figure 8 ) is greater than financial subsidy indicates that the revenue TIP of WT and ESS from the energy and auxiliary service market is positive.
Finally, the impact of ITC policy on investors' behavior under the deregulated market mechanism is studied. Figure 9 shows the impact of ITC financial incentive intensity on installed capacity of WT and ESS under deregulated market mechanism, as well as the impact on amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. The financial incentive intensity of ITC increases from (0, 0) to (40%, 40%), the installed capacity of WT and ESS increased by 56 MW (form 33 MW to 89 MW) and 16 MW (form 6 MW to 22 MW) respectively, and the amount of wind energy utilization increased by 509 MWh (from 404 MWh to 913 MWh). The social cost, coalition profit and financial subsidy are given in Figure 10 . ITC financial incentive policies that directly reduce capital costs can effectively improve the installed capacity of WT and ESS and reduce social costs. When ITC financial incentive subsidy reaches (40%, 40%), social cost is reduced by 5574 $ (from 91016 $ to 85442 $), and total coalition profit increases by 12919 $ (from 1768 $ to 14687 $). Besides, the impact of reserve capacity on coalition profits and social costs under the different market mechanisms is analyzed, and the results are given in Figure 11 .
Reserve capacity leads to the continuous increase of social costs, but the impact on coalition profits are not monotonous. Although reserve capacity will increase social cost, the social cost of centralized market mechanism is lower than that of deregulated market mechanism. The coalition profits without financial incentive under the centralized market mechanism is FIGURE 11. The impact of reserve capacity on coalition profits and social costs under the different market mechanism.
zero (blue bar is invisible), while the coalition profits under the deregulated market mechanism is positive.
For the numerical results from the deregulated market mechanism, from figure 7 and figure 9, both PTC and ITC financial incentives can increase the installed capacity of WT and ESS to improve the utilization of wind energy. From figure 8 and figure 10 , both PTC and ITC financial incentives can increase the coalition profit, but the effect of these two financial incentives in reducing social costs is different. Besides, the revenue TIP of WT and ESS from the energy and auxiliary service market under the deregulation market mechanism is positive.
The impact of two financial incentives (PTC and ITC) on investors and power system economy under two market mechanisms (centralized and deregulated market mechanism) has been studied based on modified IEEE 6-bus test system. The average computation time for each case under the centralized and deregulated market mechanism is 3 seconds and 60 seconds respectively. The former is to maximize social welfare problem, which is a tractable LP, while the latter is to maximizing investment profit problem, which is a complex MILP.
B. MODIFIED IEEE 30-BUS TEST SYSTEM
In this section, we apply the proposed model and the solution methodology considering the modified IEEE 30-bus test system to illustrate the fragilities of financial incentive. The modified test system has 30 nodes that are connected through 41 transmission lines. The set of buses where WT can be installed includes buses 2, 6, 10, 12, and the set of buses where ESS can be installed includes buses 4, 10, 15, 27. The maximum load demand in the modified IEEE 30-bus test system are 125% of their original values, and the capacity of lines is 90% of their original values. The parameter of TG are given in Table 3 .
In this test system, the difference between the production cost of TG and the capital cost of WT is relatively small. Besides, we focus on the comparison of electrical information and economic indicators result from centralized and deregulated market mechanisms base on the same financial incentives.
To begin with, the installed capacity of WT and ESS as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment result from under the different market mechanism based on PTC financial subsidies are given in Figure 12 . Figure 12 indicates that for the installed capacity of WT and ESS, the result of centralized market mechanism is greater than that of deregulated market mechanism. Besides, the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment under the centralized market mechanism is also greater than that deregulated market mechanism. Meanwhile, the comparison results of economic indicators are shown in Figure 13 .
Under the same PTC financial subsidy intensity, the centralized market mechanism has a lower social cost, while deregulation market mechanism has a higher coalition profit. This result is consistent with Figures 8 and 10 . We use the LMP to explain the huge differences between the electrical information and economic indicators under the two market mechanisms. For example, without financial subsidies, the LMP of each node under the two market mechanisms is given in Figure 14 .
The average value, minimum value and maximum value of LMP under the centralized market mechanism are 31 $/MWh, 0 $/MWh, and 258 $/MWh, respectively. The average value, minimum value and maximum value of LMP under the deregulated market mechanism are 77 $/MWh, 57 $/MWh, and 1156 $/MWh, respectively. Coalition under deregulated market mechanism tend to lower the installed capacity of WT and ESS so that the increase of LMP, which will in turn bring higher profits to coalition. Besides, it should be noted that there would be zero marginal cost under the centralized market mechanism (from 1:00 to 10:00).
Besides, the installed capacity of WT and ESS as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment result from under the different market mechanism based on ITC financial subsidies are given in Figure 15 .
As mentioned above, the installed capacity of WT and ESS under the centralized market mechanism is larger than that of deregulated market. However, when the proportion of ITC financial incentive subsidy reaches 30%, the amount of wind energy curtailment is far greater than the amount of wind energy utilization, which shows that the intensity of financial subsidy is unreasonable. In the PTC financial incentive in Figure 12 , there are also wind energy curtailment far greater than wind energy utilization. Although the two financial incentives are the same, the phenomenon does not exist in the IEEE 6-bus system. Therefore, when the difference between TG production cost and WT capital cost is small, financial incentive policies should be carefully designed. Furthermore, the results of social cost and coalition profit based on ITC financial subsidy under the two market mechanisms are shown in Figure 16 . We note that ITC financial subsidies can effectively reduce social costs under both centralized and deregulated market mechanisms. Besides, the coalition profit under the centralized market mechanism completely covers ITC financial subsidies.
Based on the modified IEEE 30-bus test system, the electrical information and economic indicators under the same financial incentive are analyzed. When the difference between thermal power production cost and capital cost is small, the driving force of financial incentive policy is not significant. Besides, the incentive effect of PTC policy under deregulated market mechanism is not significant (Figure 7 and Figure 12 ), while that of ITC policy under both market mechanisms is significant. The average computation time for each case under the centralized and deregulated market mechanism is 5 s and 400 s respectively. Large-scale system will increase the computation time of coordinated planning problem under deregulated market mechanism, which is acceptable for offline simulation.
In summary, under the centralized market mechanism, the total coalition profit under the financial incentive of PTC and ITC does not exceed the financial subsidy. Specifically, the total coalition profits (TCP PTC ) under PTC financial incentive is lower than financial subsidy, while the total coalition profits (TCP ITC ) under ITC financial incentive is equal to financial subsidy. Under deregulated market mechanism, the total coalition profit under the financial incentive of PTC and ITC is no less than the financial subsidy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a coordinated planning and operation model of power system considering market mechanism and financial incentive policy. The results from the presented case study yield the following conclusions:
For the centralized market mechanism, the revenue of coalition from energy and auxiliary market are non-positive (TIP is non-positive). For the deregulated market mechanism, the revenue of coalition from energy and auxiliary market are positive (TIP is positive).
The incentive effect of PTC policy under the centralized market mechanism is significant, which can increase the installed capacity of WT and ESS, and reduce the social cost. However, PTC policy under deregulated market mechanism is fragile. The incentive effect of ITC policy under centralized and deregulated market mechanism is significant, which can increase the installed capacity of WT and ESS, and reduce social costs.
The installed capacity of WT and ESS under the centralized market mechanism is larger than that under the deregulated market mechanism, as well as the amount of wind energy utilization and curtailment. The social cost under the centralized market mechanism is lower than that under the deregulated market mechanism, while the coalition profit under the centralized market mechanism is lower than that under the deregulated market mechanism. This phenomenon can be explained by the LMP. Compared with the deregulated market mechanism, the LMP under the centralized market mechanism is very small (part of LMP is zero or negative), and the difference of nodal price in temporal and spatial is not significant.
Future research will focus on the design of financial incentives and the impact of uncertainty. Design reasonable financial incentives to avoid transitional investment in RES. Uncertainty will affect the return of investors, then it is of great significance to study the investment of renewable energy by applying risk management theory.
APPENDIX KKT CONDITIONS FOR MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE
KKT condition includes three parts: primal constraint, firstorder optimality condition and complementary slackness constraints. Note that the Lagrange function is omitted.
Firstly, the primal constraint consists of equation (1)-(4), (6)- (7) , and (9)- (17) , and (19)- (22) .
Secondly, the first-order optimality condition are as follows.
b i − λ t n,i − λ t g,i +λ t g,i = 0 (68) −λ t n,i − λ t w,i +λ t w,i = 0 (69) Thirdly, the complementary slackness constraints are as follows.
λ t g,ur,i ur t g,i = 0 (79) λ t g,ur,i ur t g,i − ur max g,i = 0 (80) λ t g,dr,i dr t g,i = 0 (81) λ t g,dr,i dr t g,i − dr max g,i = 0 (82) λ t g,i p min g,i + dr t g,i − p t g,i = 0 (83) λ t g,i p t g,i − p max g,i + ur t g,i = 0 (84) λ t w,i p t w,i = 0 (85) λ t w,i p t w,i − s c w n w,i = 0 (86) λ n,w,i n w,i = 0 (87) λ t es,c,i p t es,c,i = 0 (88) λ t es,c,i p t es,c,i − s c es n es,i = 0 (89) λ t es,d,i p t es,d,i = 0 (90) λ t es,d,i p t es,d,i − s c es n es,i = 0 (91) λ t es,ur,i p t es,d,i /η d + ur t es,i = 0 (92) λ t es,ur,i p t es,d,i /η d + ur t es,i − s c es n es,i = 0 (93) λ t es,dr,i η c p t es,c,i + dr t es,i = 0 (94) λ t es,dr,i η c p t es,c,i + dr t es,i − s c es n es,i = 0 (95) p τ es,d,i /η d − s soc es n es,i + dr t es,i = 0 (97) λ n,es,i n es,i = 0 (98) 
